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Patrick Luff

Attorney Profile

Top Rated Products Liability Attorney in Dallas, TX

Fears Nachawati Law Firm
5473 Blair Rd
Dallas, TX 75231
Phone: 214-890-0711
Fax: 214-890-0712
Selected to Super Lawyers: 2020 - 2021
Selected to Rising Stars: 2018 - 2019
Licensed in Texas Since: 2014
Practice Areas: Personal Injury - Products: Plaintiff
Attorney Profile

Patrick Luff is an attorney at Fears Nachawati Law Firm in Dallas, Texas, where he focuses his practice on products liability, specifically defective drug and medical device cases. He represents clients throughout the Dallas metropolitan area. 

During his time as a practicing personal injury attorney, Mr. Luff has obtained major recoveries on behalf of clients in several high-profile cases, including a wrongful death claim where he secured a $15.4 million judgment for the victim’s family. He provides committed and personal representation and advocates on behalf of his clients. 

Mr. Luff has significant knowledge and experience of personal injury law. Prior to joining Fears Nachawati Law Firm, he was a professor of law and author of articles on mass torts. He taught courses at Arizona State University, the University of Oklahoma and Washington and Lee University. 


After earning a bachelor’s degree from the University of Texas, Mr. Luff graduated from the University of Michigan Law School. Additionally, he spent time studying at University College Oxford. The National Trial Lawyers has recognized him for his accomplishments in the legal profession. In 2018 and 2019, he was featured on the organization’s “Top 40 Under 40” list.

Mr. Luff holds a license to practice law before the state courts of Texas and New Mexico. He is also qualified to appear before the U.S. district courts for the northern, southern, eastern and western districts of Texas, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States.

Practice Areas
  • 100%Personal Injury - Products: Plaintiff
Focus Areas

Medical Devices, Pharmaceutical, Products Liability


2 Years Super Lawyers
2 Years Rising Stars
  • Super Lawyers: 2020 - 2021
  • Rising Stars: 2018 - 2019

About Patrick Luff

First Admitted: 2014, Texas

Professional Webpage:

Educational Background

  • University of Texas, BA

Bar/Professional Activity

  • Board of Directors, Texas Trial Lawyers Association


  • $15.5 million judgment in wrongful death case involving negligent entrustment of a work vehicle., 2018

Scholarly Lectures/Writings

  • When economically devastated businesses need assistance from their insurance companies, know what coverages or exclusions may or may not apply., Helping Business Owners Weather COVID-19, Trial Magazine, 2020
  • This article considers the basic elements of bringing a commercial truck case as a collision avoidance technology case. , Collision Avoidance Technology in Commercial Trucks, AIEGVoice, 2020
  • This Article considers the interpretive difficulties surrounding emergency care under Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, contemplates how the emergency medical care statute applies in a variety of circumstances, and suggests a solution to the interpretive confusion created by the inclusion of the emergency medical care jury instruction in Chapter 74., Emergency Medical Care in Chapter 74: Substantive Definitions and Interpretive Quandaries,, Texas Tech Law Review, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury, 2019
  • In 1969, the Texas Legislature passed the Texas Tort Claims Act (Act). In doing so, the legislature joined a national judicial and legislative trend moving away from absolute immunity of the government for liability in tort that had been growing over the previous two decades and waived sovereign immunity for Texas governmental units, allowing lawsuits to the extent of that waiver. In the intervening fifty years, there have been perplexing and often frustrating areas of change, in addition to some troublesome areas of stagnation.This Article discusses the Act in its present state and how it should be amended to avoid constitutional problems and better serve its purpose, as well as the public. Part I discusses the foundational principles of sovereign and governmental immunity and outlines in broad strokes the main provisions of the Act as it exists today. Where revisions, or a lack thereof, are of particular importance, they are discussed. Part II explores a number of Texas cases that have interpreted the Act and the movement from an expansive to a restrictive interpretation of it. Part III examines the 2003 amendments and argues that the damages caps added in 2003 violate an amendment to the Texas Constitution passed by referendum that year. Finally, Part IV argues that damages caps in the Act should be adjusted for inflation, as are other damages caps contained in Texas law., Understanding the Texas Tort Claims Act, Texas Tech Law Review, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury, 2019
  • This article takes a new approach to evaluating regulation of tobacco in general and the regulatory impact of the tobacco litigation in particular. Rather than viewing the tobacco litigation in isolation, regulation-through-litigation as an institutional response should be compared with potential alternative institutional responses such as regulation via administrative agency or the operation of market forces. Because courts have been better at generating technocratic information and at the same time can avoid the barriers to regulation that other institutions face, courts have been and will continue to be the preferred institution for regulating the social-costs externalities of tobacco consumption. In combination with an appreciation of the main regulatory problems that tobacco presents, this conclusion suggests a re evaluation of regulatory devices such as taxation, administrative compensation systems, and liability that could address these problems. This article concludes that a court-based enterprise-liability scheme would be the most effective tool for correcting the social-cost externalities created by tobacco consumption., Evaluating the Regulatory Impact of the Tobacco Litigation, Arizona State Law Journal, 2015
  • With the rise of the modern state came increasing demands on the state to provide justice – to regulate the risks individual citizens increasingly present to one another, to ensure that contracts are enforced, or to ensure that individual respect each others’ fundamental civil rights – and much of law can be seen as political decisions about whether and how to satisfy these demands. Over the last two decades, political scientists and economists have become increasingly aware that courts have become active participants in this process. Rather than delegate enforcement to administrative agencies, which Congress may fear because of agency capture or agency drift, Congress has increasingly crafted statutes – especially those on controversial subjects – that create private rights of action. In so doing, Congress bypasses the traditional regulatory enforcement apparatus and instead makes individuals the enforcers of their statutory rights and courts the forum for enforcing regulatory rights. But the courts also act as regulators through the exercise of their traditional common law powers. Choices to adopt new theories of liability or relaxing causation requirements, for example, are driven by courts’ perceptions about the gap between governmentally provided and socially demanded levels of risk regulation, and this demand is transmitted to the courts through individual decisions to litigate. When courts act as a forum for rights-enforcement, they play a part of the role that an agency would normally play. Under this new model of regulation, courts use their normal interpretive role to fill in the gaps left in the statutes, a policymaking role that would traditionally be delegated by statute to an administrative agency. This contribution explores these push and pull pressures, which combine to create a robust regulatory role for the courts., The Political Economy of Regulatory Regulation, Edward Elgar Handbook of Political Economy and Law (Ugo Mattei & John Haskell, eds.), 2015
  • As a result of relatively weak regulation, firearm use leads to massive negative externalities. Efforts to minimize these social costs via legislation have been unsuccessful, which have led individuals and government entities to seek regulation through another avenue: litigation. This use of the courts as a regulatory gap-filler raises vital questions, among which perhaps the most vital is whether courts are effective at performing this role. This Article seeks to answer that question by comparing the courts as an institution with other institutions, such as markets, legislatures, and administrative agencies. I consider a number of factors that can be used to measure institutional effectiveness, and argue that courts are the optimal (albeit imperfect) institution for dealing with firearm-related externalities. I then consider a number of remedies that could be used to address the firearm-related externalities, concluding that damage awards are appropriate to remedy these social costs, while at the same time creating market-based incentives to reduce future externalities., Regulating Firearms Through Litigation, Connecticut Law Review, 2014
  • According to public choice, the predominant paradigm of modern regulatory theory, legislative activity provides benefits to small, organized interests at the expense of larger groups. In practice, this means that interest groups are often able to benefit themselves at the expense of the public good. This model has been extended to the courts, which are described as implicit or explicit actors in the wealth-transfer process. Applying public-choice theory to the courts, however, overlooks the structural differences between the federal judiciary and Congress, as well as the insights of judicial decision making theory. Not only do judges receive better and more complete information than legislators, but they also process that information differently, leading to more reliably public-interested results. This should cause us to rethink the counter majoritarian difficulty, and by extension, judicial restraint. The counter majoritarian difficulty is grounded in the presumption that Congress enacts the majority will, which courts disrupt through judicial review. Where courts act with the public interest in mind, and therefore implement the majority will, while the legislature serves private interests, the case for judicial restraint based on the counter majoritarian nature of the courts is significantly undermined., Captured Legislatures and Public-Interested Courts, Utah Law Review, 2013
  • Since at least the 1960s, when Congress enacted civil rights statutes that provided for private enforcement, courts have been hotbeds of public policy. Only recently, however, has this phenomenon been recognized for what it is: courts have become essential actors in the regulatory state. What little scholarship there is on the use of courts to achieve regulatory ends is often heavy on rhetoric, but short on theory. While commentators have been quick to criticize the phenomenon of regulatory litigation, they have done little to determine what it actually is. As a result, the young field of regulatory litigation lacks fundamental theoretical discussions necessary for the fruitful development of the field. This article fills the gaps in the theoretical literature in three ways. First, this article presents the theory that regulatory litigation has developed to address the gaps between socially demanded levels of risk regulation and the amount of risk protection actually provided by the state. Second, this article collects and analyzes the scholarship to date that attempts to find the line that divides regulatory from non-regulatory litigation, and explains how and why previous definitions of regulatory litigation have fallen short. Finally, this article presents a theoretical discussion of the nature of regulatory litigation that distinguishes between top-down regulation through statutory promulgation and bottom-up regulation that occurs through the remedial choices made by litigants and judges., Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation, Rutgers Law Review, 2011
  • A fundamental principle of remedies is that the remedy should be sufficient to place the injured party in the position he would have occupied but for the wrong suffered. But law and equity come to very different conclusions about what remedy is sufficient to restore a plaintiff to his status quo ante when real property, rare property, and property with high sentimental but low market value are involved. Equity treats the loss of these items as irreparable injury, meaning that damages are not adequate to compensate the victim for their loss. But if the real property is seized in eminent domain proceedings, or rare or sentimental personal property is destroyed, the market value of these items is generally deemed at law to provide an adequate measure of the value of the loss, so that giving the plaintiff market value damages constitutes an adequate remedy at law. This demonstrates a fundamental tension between law and equity: law presumes that the market value is the measure of the damages suffered from the loss, but equity presumes that the damages from this same loss is immeasurable; were it otherwise, damages would be adequate, and equity jurisdiction would not be invoked. This article examines this tension and concludes that the market value rule of damages fails to provide an adequate remedy when real property is seized in eminent domain or when irreplaceable personal property is destroyed through some wrongful act., The Market Value Rule of Damages and the Death of Irreparable Injury, Cleveland State Law Review, 2011
  • It is often argued that class actions are unfair to businesses and individuals alike. In recognition of these complaints, it has been suggested that, in determining whether or not to certify a class action, the judge should weigh the perceived costs and benefits that the certification decision would produce. In fact, a rule proposed in 1996 would have required courts to consider the costs and benefits of a class action in deciding whether to certify a class. Despite this proposed rule's failure, courts continue to use a cost-benefit analysis in making their certification decisions. This Article demonstrates that the arguments that favor a cost-benefit analysis stage in class action certifications fail because they are based on insufficient or misguided criteria. This Article emphasizes that the correct criteria by which to judge class-certification decisions are deterrence of socially harmful conduct and individual compensation for wrongdoing. In assessing courts' use of cost-benefit analyses in class action certifications, this Article concludes that using such a test defeats the goals of compensation and deterrence, which are the proper ends of the class action device., Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit Analyses in Class Action Certification Decisions, University of Memphis Law Review, 2010

Other Outstanding Achievements

  • Appointed by the New Mexico Attorney General to represent the State of New Mexico in litigation against Johnson & Johnson., 2021
  • Lead briefing attorney in successful 11th Circuit appeal involving medical device preemption issue., 2017
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Office Location for Patrick Luff

5473 Blair Rd
Dallas, TX 75231

Phone: 214-890-0711

Fax: 214-890-0712

Last Updated: 3/17/2021

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